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Abstract
This paper explores the individual incentives of participating in interna-
tional environmental agreements (IEAs) with social preferences (also known
as other-regarding preferences) in a static model through the experimental
method. More specically, the focus is on the impact of individual preferences
of inequality-aversion. The experimental method has been used to capture
actual decisions in a puried laboratory environment. Our theoretical pre-
diction expects that players with high degree of inequality-averse preferences
will violate the internal and the external constraints. As a consequence,
the stable coalition formation may not necessary exists. The experimental
outcomes show that a stable coalition is indeed very rare. Individual pref-
erences on inequality-aversion do matter for coalition formation. However,
highly inequality-averse subjects, are less likely to violate the internal con-
straint by leaving the coalition. Hence, the IEA formation is usually larger
than the equilibrium formation.
Key words: Social preference, experimental design, international
environmental agreement, inequality aversion
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1. Introduction
International environmental agreements (IEAs) are typically viewed as
coalitions of agents providing public goods (e.g., abatements of greenhouse
gas emissions). Barrett (1994) provides a seminal study that positions self-
enforcingas a key incentive for providing public goods by participating and
Preprint submitted to A Critical Approach to International Environmental AgreementsApril 9, 2015
interacting in IEAs. His key assumption of the absence of a supra-national
body to structure an IEA leads him to suggest that participation is voluntary
and all countries are free to enter or to withdraw from a coalition. While an
IEA aims to maximise the aggregate net benet, individual nonsignatories
aim to maximise their own net benet. In joining an IEA, signatories receive
a reward from acceding to the agreement and avoid the punishment from
withdrawing. Non-signatories may be penalised but also enjoy the free-riding
benet. The majority of the literature, however, follows DAspremont et al.
(1983) who argue that a stable coalition has two constraints: the internal one
where no signatory has any incentive to withdraw from the coalition; and the
external one where no nonsignatory has any incentive to join the coalition.
In the existing literature, two issues still await to be addressed: the ar-
guably unavoidable free-riding e¤ect and a presumed egoistic preference.
Free-riding has largely been considered as the most important obstacle for
the formation and existence of successful IEAs. This is the main reason why,
a large IEA is not easy to be formed without any policing mechanism, in light
of the Nash equilibria static game. However, recent experimental evidences
on IEAs suggest that people are far less likely to free ride and more likely to
cooperate than the theory suggests (Kosfeld et al., 2009; Burger and Kolstad,
2009). But why this is so has not been well-explained by the models in the
literature.
Furthermore, existing research ndings on IEAs largely presume that an
individuals preference is egoistic/selsh. In light of the Nash equilibrium,
this implies that a rational agent would choose the highest payo¤. The as-
sumption has been widely employed in the majority of the theoretical studies
of IEAs (e.g. Barrett, 1994, 2001; and Breton et al. 2010). However, recent
experimental evidences have suggested that the assumption of egoistic pref-
erences is not enough to explain individual decision makersbehaviours in
an interactive game (Kosfeld et al., ibid ; Burger and Kolstad, ibid). These
studies claim that people are far less likely to free ride and more likely to
cooperate than the egoistic prediction assumes. Hence, social preference (or
other-regarding preference) has been proposed in recent studies (e.g. Kol-
stad, 2014) to address this gap. The solutions to international environmental
problems require cooperation and interaction between di¤erent nations at a
global scale so as to prevent environmental or natural disasters or damages
from happening. International cooperations are called for to deal with global
issues. In such interactive game with common goal to minimise the loss of the
society and environment, the assumption of a pure egoistic preference may
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not be enough to capture players behaviours. This study follows this trend
of thought and considers two types of other-regarding preference, namely
inequality-aversion and altruism, to develop the model and experimental de-
sign.
Some have suggested to address this limitation by taking the role of other-
regarding preferences (also known as social preferences) into account. Kos-
feld et al. (ibid) employ the inequality-averse preference (proposed by Fehr
and Schmidt, 1999) and conrm with laboratory-based evidence that when
inequality-averse players exist, the coalition is no longer a Nash prediction,
and the grand coalition becomes an expected equilibrium outcome. On the
other hand, Kolstad (ibid) adopts Charness and Rabins (2002) social pref-
erences theory which suggest that agents mainly care about three things :
private payo¤, fairness in payo¤s, and overall e¢ ciency. In contrast to the
nding of Kosfeld et al. (ibid), Kolstad argues that the size of an equilibrium
of a coalition is smaller when social preferences exist.
Although the coalition formation with social preference has been exam-
ined in the literature, its inuence on individual behaviours in an interactive
coalition has not been fully explored. In other words, individual incentives
for participating in a coalition are still unclear. This is partly due to the
fact that economic models usually are based on several assumptions to re-
duce uncertainties and ambiguities. But these assumptions make capturing
individual incentives di¢ cult. For example, even with the assumption of het-
erogeneous agents, players were given the same payo¤table in an experiment.
There exist multiple equilibria and several possible coalition combinations,
individual incentives are not possible to be predicted.
To address these gaps in experimental studies, eight particular treatments
which have unique equilibrium coalition are employed in this study. In these
treatments, each agent has a weakly dominant strategy to follow. The indi-
vidual preference is therefore identiable and can be observed.
This design o¤ers two main advantages: rstly, this study endeavours to
investigate incentives for participating in IEAs. If a coalition has more than
one equilibrium, individual decisions cannot be predicted. But, if we have
a coalition with a unique equilibrium, it would provide a suitable environ-
ment to observe individual decisions when every player has a best strategy
to make. Secondly, the hypothesis of this study assumes that the other-
regarding preference would inuence the equilibrium di¤erently from the
egoistic preference. This entails that a coalition would be formed di¤erently
when individuals care about others agentspayo¤s.
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To the best of our knowledge, what motivates individuals to participate
in a public goods coalition has not yet been fully explored in the existing
literature. This study asks the following questions: Does the concern about
fairness change playersdecisions? If so, how much would they care? How
do individualssocial preferences a¤ect their own incentives for participating
in a public good game?
To answer these questions, we have designed an experiment as follows.
It comprises of two parts: the rst part aims to nd out the individual
inequality-averse preference. The subjects of the experiment are paired and
asked to choose from a certain fair payo¤and an all-or-nothing payo¤. When
the expected payo¤ is higher than the fair payo¤, those who prefer to have
the fair payo¤ would be considered as inequality-averse players. They would
be more likely to break the internal and external constraints in the coalition
game.
The second part is a public good game. The subjects are grouped into
5-player groups. Since our main interest lies in the formation of IEAs, the
experiment has taken out the abatement game, and turned it into a public
good game which mimics the membership decision process. The subjects are
given particular payo¤ tables to decide whether or not to join the coalition.
Bearing in mind the results from the rst experiment, the predictions with
the other-regarding preferences are expected to explain a smaller free-riding
e¤ect and various coalition combinations.
Our theoretical nding predicts that, if the internal and external con-
straints hold and the condition for the unique equilibrium is satised, the
coalition formation could be either a unique n-member coalition, or a unique
coalition which is larger than n, or an unstable coalition with di¤erent
inequality-averse preferences. The constraints could be violated when agents
have strong attitude of inequality-aversion. However, our experimental evi-
dence does not fully support the theory. In terms of the individual decisions,
when subjects could free-ride, those with a higher marginal benet were less
likely to join a coalition and prefer to have a lower payo¤. On the other
hand, the subjects with a high degree of religious belief were more likely to
be free-riders by not joining a coalition and having higher payo¤.
From the questionnaire in the experiment, we learnt that right-wingers
are more likely to build a larger coalition when they could be free-riders.
Comparing to the results on the internal constraint, right-wingers are more
likely to violate both internal and external constraints. Right-wingers tend
to act strategically by punishing and compromising when they are in di¤erent
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roles.
The article is structured as follows. After the introduction, in Section 2,
we build a model based on heterogeneous players. In order to investigate the
individual behaviour in the coalition formation, we will focus on the case of
unique equilibrium coalitions. In Section 3, the data from two experiments
which are based on the theory discussed in Section 2 will be presented. In
Section 4, we discuss the implications of the model and possible applications,
and conclude. The theoretical proofs, the instructions of the experiment are
included in the appendices.
2. The model
2.1. Benchmark model with heterogeneous players
Supposed there are N countries with di¤erent marginal benet of total
abatement, we label them as country 1, 2, :::, N . There are now 2N (N + 1)
possible coalition combinations 1. In order to clarify, we assume that player
1, 2,:::, n are in the group to form an IEA, player n+1, n+2, :::, N are not 2.
We rank n countries in the coalition according to the value of their marginal
benet of abatement going from high to low as 1 > ::: > n. On the other
hand, the nonsignatories are also ranked from high to low as n+1 > ::: > N
Any marginal benet of total abatement (k; 8k 2 [1; :::; N ]) is in the range
between 0 and 13. The unit cost of abatement for each country is assumed
as 1.
Each country faces a game which run in two stages: at the rst stage,
players play a membership game where they decide whether to participate
in the coalition or not. At the second stage, given the decision made at
the rst stage, signatories and nonsignatories play the emissions abatement
1Any coalition needs at least 2 players. No coalition is a possible solution if no one
cooperates.
2Any coalition needs at least 2 members, so n 2 [2; N ].
3The meaningful range of the marginal benet of total abatement (k) is between 0 and
1. When k is too large (1  k), an IEA is unnecessary because players already have the
incentive to abate fully. When the aggregate marginal benet is too small (
NX
k=1
k  1),
a protable IEA is also non-existent because all players would pollute anyway. When the
marginal benet is in between, there may exist stable coalitions where signatories abate
and nonsignatories pollute.
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game respectively. Each nonsignatory makes her own decision on emissions
abatement with the objective of maximising her individual payo¤. Mean-
while, members follow a common decision on abatement with the common
objective of maximising the coalition payo¤. We solve this two-stage game
by backward induction.
We start with the abatement game. Let any nonsignatory js abatement
be denoted by xj. In order to simplify the model, the cost and benet
functions are both linear and the normalised level of abatement (xj) is in the
range between 0 (implies full pollute) and 1 (implies full abate).
With a protable n-member coalition, a nonsignatory js payo¤ function
j with respect to the abatement xj is presented as
max
xj
j = ( xj) + jX 8 nonsignatory j = n+ 1; :::; N (1)
where X =
nX
i=1
xs +
NX
j=n+1
xj
where xj is the individual abatement with its marginal benet rate j
4. X is
the total abatement which includes n signatoriesaggregate reduction (
nP
i=1
xs)
5 and (N   n) nonsignatoriesaggregate reduction (
NP
j=n+1
xj). From the rst
order condition of (1) with respect to xj, we have polluting (xj = 0) is the
best strategy for a nonsignatory j.
For any signatory i, all members act as one to maximise the coalition
payo¤ and share this coalition payo¤ equally. The n-member coalition pay-
o¤ (s) is the overall payo¤ of all members (i). The coalition payo¤ is
maximised by choosing the common abatement (xs)
max
xs
s =
X
i
i =
nX
i
[( xs) + iX] (2)
4j 2 fn+1; :::; Ng
5Because members in the coalition move as one, the aggregate emission abatement
would be
nP
i=1
xs = n  xs.
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From the rst order condition of (2) with respect to xs, we have
@s
@xs
=  n+ n
nX
i
i = 0 (3)
When
Pn
i i < 1, polluting is the best strategy but then the coalition would
be meaningless. To form a protable coalition, the total contribution should
go beyond the threshold which the sum of marginal benet of members is
lager than 1 (
Pn
i i  1) and the best strategy for all members is fully
abating (xs = 1).
Since the coalition aims to maximise its payo¤, individual decisions of
members should achieve this goal. Burger and Kolstad (2009) note that ma-
jority voting rule, unanimity and joint payo¤maximisation are all equivalent
under the assumption of homogeneous agents. However, with heterogeneous
agents, they suggest that majority voting reects the interests of the median
voter and may not reach a joint payo¤maximum. Although wealth transfers
among member of the coalition is often suggested as being politically infea-
sible, Kolstad (2014) states that sharing the wealthwithin the coalition
might be appropriate.
Hence, to achieve the goal of maximum a coalition payo¤, each member
shares the same responsibility. We assume that the coalition payo¤ is equally
shared by all signatories. Any signatory i with a n-member coalition has a
payo¤
i =
1
n
s (4)
It should be noted that a rule of the coalition requires coalition members
using transfers to equalise net payo¤s between agents. Such rule achieves a
less unequal distribution of payo¤s through transferring. This assumption
implies that for the main purpose of this study, it is di¢ cult to separate
out the issue of IEA formation and its impact on fairness from the fact that
the IEA is itself a mechanism for achieving a less unequal distribution of
payo¤s through using transfers. Countries with higher marginal benet of
the total abatement are more likely to leave the coalition ex post, because
those countries could earn higher payo¤ for the absence. However, we assume
that countries have the full information when they agree to participate in an
IEA, they know the consequence of being signatories and nonsignatories.
Signatories will commit to stay in the coalition and make transfer to equalise
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individual payo¤s. We appreciate that this is a strong assumption6. However,
considering each member have to move as one to maximise the coalition
payo¤, every member would share equally responsibility. Hence, our design
of sharing the coalition is still an adequate solution.
Hence, the payo¤ of a signatory i in a protable coalition is
i =  1 +
nX
i
i (5)
In the membership game, players are asked to decide to participate in a
coalition or not. The decisions are made simultaneously. With the internal
and the external constraints by DAspremont et al. (1983),
Internal constraint : sn (n
) > nsn (n
   1) (6)
External constraint : sN (n
 + 1) < nsN (n
) (7)
There exist stable coalitions. The internal constraint (6) denotes that
a signatory has no incentive to leave the n-member coalition and n is the
stable number to maintain the coalition. If it is satised, every one would like
to participate in the coalition. The external constraint (7) describes that a
nonsignatory has no incentives to participate in a coalition as the (n + 1)-th
member. If it is satised, all nonsignatories do not want to participate 7.
This study attempts to test the theory based on heterogeneous agents by
conducting an experiment. Existing experimental studies (such as Kosfeld et
6The rule would deter a country to abandon its commitment on membership by some
policies, e.g. high penalty punishment and international sanction.
The issue of di¤erent policy instruments of transfer and commitment could be discussed
by further studies.
7The stability of the coalition can be explained with two 3-player cases. In case (i),
if the aggregate marginal benet of total abatement is too small to form a protable
coalition, there is no stable IEA. For example, when the set of the marginal benet of
players 1, 2 and 3 is f0:4; 0:3; 0:2g, no player would like to participate because all possible
combination are unprotable.
In case (ii), when the aggregate marginal benet is high enough, there might exist an
equilibrium or equilibria coalitions. For example, given the set of marginal benet is
f0:7; 0:6; 0:35g, there exist two stable coalitions {1; 2} and {1; 3}. In the former case, the
internal constraint is satised when both players 1 and 2 have no incentive to dissolve the
coalition by leaving. On the other hand, the external constraint is satised when player 3
has no incentive to join since the reward of free-riding is better than that of participation.
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al., 2009) assume that all agents are identical. However, this assumption is
far from the reality. Even the assumption of heterogeneity is considered by
Burger and Kolstad (2009), there exist more than one equilibrium coalition in
their experimental design. Though the formation of IEAs could be expected,
it is not enough to predict individual decisions in the membership game by
these past studies. In order to address this gap in the literature, this study
considers the condition of uniqueness of equilibrium. The condition provides
the existence of a unique stable n-member coalition where n is the minimum
number to form a protable coalition. By this condition, individual decisions
could be predicted.
Condition 1. (Uniqueness of equilibrium)
Suppose all players are self-interested, when the internal and the external
constraints are satised, there exists a unique stable n-member coalition if
and only if 1 + n >
PN
i=1 i
The proof is presented in Appendix 1.
The condition implies that the stable coalition is unique if the absence
of any single signatory cannot be replaced by the entry of all nonsignatories.
The unique equilibrium condition ensure that the formation is the only one
protable coalition ( 1 + Pni=1 i > 0). If any player from player 1 to n
leaves the coalition, there is no substitution to form a protable coalition.
Connecting the internal constraint (
Pn
i=1 i > 1) with the unique equilibrium
condition, we have
nX
i=1
i > 1 >
n 1X
i=1
i +
NX
j=n+1
j
By subtracting
Pn 1
i=1 i from both sides, we derive that
n >
NX
j=n+1
j
Whilst we acknowledge this indeed a strong condition, however, in order
to identify the individual incentives to participate in the coalition, such a
condition provides an environment where each agent has a weakly dominant
strategy in terms of their own payo¤s.
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2.2. Inequality-averse preference in a coalition game
The constraints above are considered assuming individuals have egoistic
preferences. As mentioned previously, this assumption fails to capture the
idea that individuals may behave di¤erently in a practical interactive game.
In order to address this limitation, we now incorporate the idea of other-
regardingpreferences into our analysis to examine individual incentives.
Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999), we assume that subjects dislike unfair
outcomes at di¤erent levels. Subjects feel disadvantaged when they are better
o¤ or worse o¤ in material terms. With this concept, the utility of a player
k of a protable n-member coalition can be represented as
uk (n) (8)
= k (n)  k
N   1
X
k0 6=k
max (k0 (n)  k (n) ; 0)  k
N   1
X
k0 6=k
max (k (n)  k0 (n) ; 0)
where Player k0 denotes all players except player k. The rst term is the
payo¤ of player k and the second term indicates the average utility loss
from other player k0 with the disadvantage-loss parameter k. The third
term measures the average loss from other player k0 with the advantage-loss
parameter k, which is assumed within the range between 0 (inequality-
neutral) and 1 (highest degree of inequality-aversion).
When the individual inequality-averse preference is considered in the util-
ity function, the internal and the external constraints (6) and (7) and be
rewritten as
Internal constraint : usn (n
) > unsn (n
   1) (9)
External constraint : usN (n
 + 1) < unsN (n
) (10)
An unique n-member coalition will still exist when all agents are self-
interested. When an agent has a high attitude of individual inequality-
aversion, the internal and the external constraints (9) and (10) could be
violated. We have the following hypothesis on the coalition formation.
Conjecture 2.
If the internal and external constraints hold and the condition for the
unique equilibrium is satised, the coalition formation could be either a unique
n-member coalition, or a unique coalition which is larger than n, or an
unstable coalition with di¤erent inequality-averse preferences.
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The explanations of the possible outcomes are shown in Appendix 2.
Three possible outcomes are depending upon di¤erent circumstances of indi-
vidual inequality-averse preferences :
(i) When all players have no inequality-aversion or a low degree of inequality-
aversion, there exists a unique n-member coalition equilibrium.
(ii) When any player from players n + 1 to N has a high degree of
inequality-aversion (large ), the external constraint could be violated. If
other things are equal, the coalition formation is stable and larger than n.
(iii) When any player from players 1 to n has a high degree of inequality-
aversion, the internal constraint could be violated. The coalition formation
then becomes unstable.
Without taking inequality-aversion into account, a unique stable coalition
is formed with three constraints. When the inequality-aversion is considered
as part of the individual preferences, there are a number of e¤ects. First,
inequality-aversion reduces countriesutility when payo¤s are not equal. The
incentive of being a nonsignatory therefore decreases and the external con-
straint is more likely to be violated. This will tend to increase the size of a
stable coalition.
Second, countries with strong inequality aversion would be encouraged
to stay in an IEA or join it to spread the benets of equalisation because
of the transfer mechanism where signatories share the same coalition payo¤.
However, except for a grand coalition, any combinations of IEAs has a free-
riding e¤ect. An expanding IEA will tend to exacerbate the payo¤ gap
between signatories and nonsignatories. Signatories with a strong sense of
inequality-aversion may violate the internal constraint if the payo¤ gap is
large. Under this condition, the most likely outcome would be to have no
IEA at all, so a certain level of inequality aversion can destabilise an IEA.
When inequality-aversion is taken into account, the net e¤ect of these two
factors shapes the stability and the formation of IEA.When a country decides
to join a coalition given the rst e¤ect, the participation will lead to a smaller
advantage loss but a larger disadvantage loss. With this character, a stable
coalition can not be easily expand by the rst e¤ect. On the other hand,
as long as stable equilibrium is not a grand coalition, there exists inequality.
The payo¤ gaps between signatories and nonsignatories are enlarged with
the second e¤ect. The internal constraint is more di¢ cult to be satised and
the coalition formation becomes unstable.
In terms of the design of this particular example, the external constraint
will not be violated given the highest degree of inequality-aversion. Hence, a
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larger stable coalition is not possible in this case.
3. Experiment design and procedure
The experiment was conducted at the centre for EXperimental ECo-
nomics (EXEC) laboratory at the University of York (UK) and programmed
with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). There were 50 subjects who were registered
on the ORSEE registration system by Greiner (2004). They were students
from di¤erent countries and in various disciplines at the University. This
sample that mimics the diversity in the real world where international policy
makers and multidisciplinary knowledge are present helps understand IEAs
formation. To ensure the data quality, the subjects had to comprehend the
rules of the game as much as possible. To do so, the experimenter introduced
the rules and gave the participants time to read through the instructions thor-
oughly and accomplish the controlled questions. In the end of each part of
the experiment, four control questions were asked to test the subjectsun-
derstanding of the payo¤ tables. A new part would only start if all subjects
had answered all control questions correctly.
A questionnaire was circulated before the experiment to gather demo-
graphical information, including the subjects degree disciplines, age (the
year they were born), ethnicity, political orientation, and the level of belief
in a religion. This questionnaire is designed to gather more explanation on
their decision-making in the experiment. The rst three questions are objec-
tive and the data shows the diversity of the participants. The distribution of
subjectsmajor are: 11 participants recruited were reading Economics; 8 par-
ticipants in Humanities; 13 participants in Science; 1 participant in Laws;
9 participants in Engineering; 1 participant in Psychology; 7 participants
in other disciplines and no recruit was reading Business-related disciplines.
The distribution of ethnicity: 32 subjects were white; 15 were Asian or Asian
British; 2 were Black or African or Caribbean or Black British; and 1 fell
into the category of any other ethnic groups. Also, all participants were un-
dertaking undergraduate or postgraduate courses at the University and their
average age was 25 years-old (the oldest being 45 and the youngest being
21).
The last two questions were concerning their subjective preferences. The
distribution of their level of belief on religions while subjects were asked to
identify themselves on a scale ranging from level 1 (not religious at all) to 5
(extremely religious). In the results, 20 subjects consider themselves to be
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atheist. Meanwhile, 6, 8, 9, and 7 subjects consider themselves as religious,
with mild belief, median belief, strong belief and pure religionists respectively.
The average level is 2:5. The distribution shows that the subjectsreligious
belief is between mild to median belief, overall. The other question aims to
indicate the subjectspolitical preference (level one indicates left, level two
centre-left, level three neutral, level four centre-right and level 5 right). In
our sample, 7 subjects self-identied themselves as left wing; 10 as centre-left;
25 as neutral; 7 as centre-right and 1 as right wing.
The experimental procedure was designed as follows.
3.1. An inequality-averse preference test
This test aimed to examine the subjects individual attitude towards
inequality-aversion. To measure a subjects inequality-averse preference, the
subjects who did not know each other were paired together. The subjects
did not know their partners and the partnersdecisions during the
whole test. Their payo¤s were determined by their own decisions as well as
their partners decisions. This was to understand the individual preferences
without knowing their strategies they played. The subjects were required
to answer a series of decision questions in 11 rounds as shown in Table 1.
Option 1 meant the subjects share the same allowance, while Option 2 meant
the subjects could take all-or-nothing with a certain probability.
Given the allowance £ 5, which would be shared by a subject (denoted
as A afterward) receiving x and another subject (denoted as B afterward)
receiving (5  x). Subject As inequality-averse utility was determined by
both her and the other subjects shares as displayed in Table 1.
UA (x; 5  x) =

x   [(5  x)  x]
x   [x  (5  x)]
if x  2:5
if x  2:5 (11)
The upper function represents Subject As utility when A has less than
half of the total allowance. The parameter  is the coe¢ cient of the average
disadvantage loss of A. On the other hand, when A has more than half of
the total allowance, the lower function is As utility with the coe¢ cient of
the average advantage loss.
The function can be presented as the solid line in Figure 1. The horizontal
axis is the allowance of A while the vertical axis is As corresponding utility.
The utility depends on the payo¤ set of subject A and the opponent B
which is presented as (£ x, £ 5  x). From (11), we derive that A s utility of
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(£ 5, £ 0) is UA (5; 0) = 5  5, and the utility of (£ 0, £ 5) is UA (0; 5) =  5,
and the utility of (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) without any inequality is UA (2:5; 2:5) = 2:5.
We normalise by setting [UA (5; 0)  UA (0; 5)] =5  1.
Given that a series of probabilities is involved in the inequality test, this
test could be characterised by strategic uncertainty. The subjectsrisk at-
titudes may be involved in their decisions. For instance, even the expected
payo¤ of taking Option 2 is higher than the payo¤ of Option 1, a risk averse
subject may prefer to the equal-share option because she or he fears the pos-
sible loss by taking Option 2. There are some experimental designs, such
as Blanco et al. (2011) and Yang et al. (2012), that attempted to exclude
strategic uncertainty. and avoid risk attitudes. They employed two games to
capture the factors that advantage or the disadvantage the subjects.
The relationship between risk-aversion and inequality-aversion has been
discussed by several recent studies. An experimental study by Carlsson et
al. (2005) also found that people who are inequality-averse are more risk-
averse, and that the reverse relation also holds true: risk-averse individuals
tend to be more inequality-averse. Given the same individual risk, Kroll and
Davidovitz (2003) provided another experimental evidence that most of the
subjects preferred equal distribution to inequality.
Whilst it should be noted that our experimental design did not exclude
the subjectsrisk attitudes, our design is still superior in the sense that the
normalisation provides a normalised inequality-averse utility in one game8.
While other studies avoid strategic uncertainty in their experiments, there
exist other factors which could lead to a biased estimation of inequality-
aversion. For example, Yang et al. (2012)s experiment shows that subjects
may have a negative advantage loss. It implies that subjects may prefer to
show o¤ rather than feel guilty when they are advantaged. Such bias does
not arise in our design because the utility has been normalised.
To nd out the inequality-averse preference, we asked each subject to
choose between two options in each row of Table 1. The rst option is a
certain option where both players share the allowance equally (£ 2:5). The
second option is an uncertain option that the subject would win all-or-nothing
depending on probability. The given probability decreased by 10% in each
8We acknowledge that there are other methods to measure attitudes to inequality.
Di¤erent to other experiments focus on social preferences, there were two social preferences
tests and one public good game in our experiment. This design could measure individual
inequality-averse attitude without complex procedures.
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round.
Since the allowance was a good, the subjects in theory would prefer to
have more. The rst row in Option 2 shows that if the probability to yield
(£ 5) is 1, any subject would choose Option 2 rather than Option 1. On
the other hand, at the bottom row in Option 2, if the probability of the set
(£ 5, £ 0) is equal to 0, subjects would prefer Option 1 rather than Option 2.
Hence, we assume that subjects will choose Option 2 in the rst few rows
and Option 1 in the last few. For each subject with a consistent preference,
there exists a point with a certain probability where the subject would switch
from Option 2 to Option 1. We denote the probability of (£ 5, £ 0) at the
switch point by p. Then subjects feel indi¤erent between (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for
sure and (£ 0;£ 5) with probability (1  p) and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability (p).
Such probability p can be seen as the weight of inequality aversion.
In Option 2, a subject is given (£ 5) with the probability p and (£ 0) with
the probability (1 p). In Option 1, the subject is given (£ 2:5) for sure. The
subject would feel indi¤erent between the sharing combination (£ 2:5, £ 2:5)
and the mixed combination of (£ 0, £ 5) with probability (1 p) and (£ 5, £ 0)
with probability (p). We can present this in an equation as
U (2:5; 2:5) = (1  p)U (0; 5) + pU (5; 0) (12)
The inequality-averse parameters  and  would be found through p.
Given that the range between the utility of all U (5; 0) and nothing U (0; 5)
is normalised, the inequality-averse preference was indi¤erent when subjects
are disadvantaged and advantaged ( = ). Although it was mentioned ear-
lier that a player might su¤er more from inequality when she is disadvantaged
(  ), there are two reasons that support us to do so. In practice, it is
not easy to nd a subjects preference without standardising the unit of the
utility. In the literature, the experimental evidences show that the disadvan-
tage factor is not necessarily smaller than the advantage factor (Dannenberg
et al., 2007; and Yang et al., 2012).
Hence, we assume that the inequality-averse preference are indi¤erent to
being disadvantaged and advantaged.
When the subject is advantaged, U(5; 0)=U(2:5; 2:5) = 1=p, we have
 =  = p  1
2
(13)
Since the probability p is in the range of 0 and 1, the inequality-averse para-
meters  and  are at the range of  1
2
to 1
2
.
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Subjects are inequality-neutral when their switch points are at p = 0:5
where the expected payo¤ is equal to the fair payo¤. The inequality-averse
preference  =  = 0 . In other words, the utility of taking all the allowance
(£ 5) is not two times higher than that of equally sharing the allowance (£ 2:5).
When the switch point is p > 0:5, subjects are inequality averse and their
utilities are lower than their monetary payo¤s. The extreme case is when
p = 1, and  is 0:5. It implies that subjects have indi¤erent preferences of
taking one unit payo¤ or equally sharing the allowance. When the advantage
aversion is very high ( > 0:5), it is considered as altruism, which is not able
to capture in this design9. Altruists would prefer to give goods to others
in order to achieve fairness. Although it is beyond the scope of this study,
altruism is an important topic that needs to be explored in future studies as
it can happen in reality.
When p is less than 0:5, subjects are not inequality-averse (neither ad-
vantage acceptors nor disadvantage acceptors). While Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) exclude inequality acceptors in their assumption, inequality-aversion
is considered in this study as it may happen in the experiment. For these
subjects, they would be considered as inequality-lovers or risk-lovers (because
the experiment has strategic uncertainty). Both inequality and risk lovers are
possible but uncommon in reality (as seen in the experimental result later),
so our study does not focus on this issue. Hence, these subjects have been
excluded from our sample10.
3.2. Experiment of a coalition game
To concentrate on the entry decision, we simplify the two-stage game into
the membership game. The game has been modied to show the situation
when a protable n-member coalition is formed (the coalition generates a
positive payo¤ if the aggregate benet-to-cost ratio of signatories is larger
than 1,
Pn
i i > 1). In this case, all signatories abate and all nonsignatories
pollute. Otherwise, the coalition collapses and all players pollute. Hence,
all elements in the payo¤ set (1 (n) ; 2 (n) ; :::; N (n)) are non-negative. It
implies that all players pursue their self-interest in maximising their own
payo¤s.
9Because the probability p is only in the range of 0 and 1.
10The existing probabilities in the test may introduce a bias by involving risk-averse
preference and hence weaken the thoery by .
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The social welfare is the aggregated payo¤s from all nonsignatories and
the coalition payo¤ . The maximum welfare exists when the grand coalition is
formed 11. All players face a dilemma of being a nonsignatory with free-rider
payo¤ or being a member with the shared payo¤.
A public good game with various payo¤tables was conducted. The results
from the previous part were used to predict whether the subjects would
violate the stability constraints in the coalition game. In the theoretical
model, this is a two-stage game. The rst stage is the membership game,
where subjects decide whether or not to join a coalition. The second stage
is the abatement game. In the abatement game, since the payo¤ is a linear
function, the decision-making would be straightforward. When a subject
decides to join a coalition, she would abate fully at the second stage. When
her decision is not to join, she would not abate at all at the second stage.
Based on this, we simplify the two-stage model to a one-stage membership
game in the experiment.
In this part, subjects were randomly assigned to groups of ve persons.
They did not know who they were playing with, but they did know that they
were playing with the same people during the whole session. In our assump-
tion, subjects should be self-motivated. Subjects were therefore required to
maximise their own payo¤s.
In each treatment, each subject was given a particular payo¤ table of all
the possible coalition combinations. A group of N subjects would generate 
2N  N   1 combinations. In order to generate a simple and clear table
for subjects, the number of 5 subjects was set in a group with 26 possible
combinations.
The game was a one-shot game, and decisions in each round were in-
dependent. With this design, the subjects know no more than their own
inequality-averse preference. However, the experiment allowed subjects to
have a learning process so that the coalition would converge to the Nash
equilibrium. The game was played 15 times in each sub-treatment. Subjects
were given 180 seconds to make their decisions of whether or not to join
the coalition. According to the pilot experiment, this time setting gave sub-
jects enough time to make their decisions. Any decision which was not made
11The total payo¤ is  = s +
P
j
j = [( n) +
Pn
i i] +
h
n
P
j j
i
. Because only a
protable coalition is counted, the total payo¤ is maximised when the grand coalition is
formed  = ( N) +PNi i.
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within this amount of time would be counted as non-participation. This rule
is sensible because the decision was asked whether or not to join a coalition
with a non-participating status.
Finally, the coalition formation and all subjects payo¤s in the group were
reported on the result screen.
When subjects are self-motivated, they therefore maximise their own pay-
o¤s. Subjects should make their decisions based on their economic incentive.
In order to ensure subjects were aware of their prot-maximising incentives
rather than other non-economic incentives, the reference to environmental
issues was removed from the instruction. The level of marginal benet of the
total abatement was labelled as parameter (k; 8k 2 [1; :::; 5]) in the exper-
imental design. There are two treatments with di¤erent parameter sets. 20
subjects took Treatment 1 and the rest of the subjects took Treatment 2.
The individual parameters in the Treatment 1 are listed in Table 2, and the
parameters in Treatment 2 are listed in Table 3.
According to Condition 1, we can claim that a unique equilibrium could
be found in some particular cases. The theoretical result suggests that a
unique equilibrium exists within the internal, the external and the unique
constraints. To achieve a unique equilibrium, the experiment was built with
some particular parameters mentioned earlier in the theory. Subjects with
high marginal benet parameter are labelled () in Tables 2 and 3, they
were predicted to have a weakly dominant strategy to join. Eight treatments
within the constraints were selected in the experiment. The theoretical size
of the stable coalition in treatments was from 2 to 4. Each group was given
four sub-treatments with a di¤erent number of subjects predicted to be in
the stable coalition.
Tables 2 and 3 present the treatments which were designed to ensure a
unique stable IEA based on the assumption of no inequality-aversion. Each
sub-treatment had a unique equilibrium and each subject had a weakly domi-
nant strategy in the membership game. Meanwhile, we propose in Conjecture
2 that di¤erent attitude to inequality-aversion may lead to higher member-
ship or no stable IEA. The internal constraint is more likely to be violated
by individuals with high degree of inequality-aversion. But due to the in-
ternal transfers, a nonsignatory would gain less advantage loss but more
disadvantage loss if she or he decides to join a coalition. Hence, the external
constraint is not easy to be violated. The experiment in this study is able to
test whether subjects with high inequality-aversion are more likely to violate
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the internal constraint and lead to unstable.
When a possible coalition is unprotable, all subjects in the group gain
nothing for return. The possible payo¤s for subjects were from £ 0 and up
to £ 24. The payo¤ depended on the given parameters and the coalition
formation. In the experiment, we simplied the decision-making process
by reducing the calculation process. With the payo¤ table, subjects could
easily nd the corresponding possible payo¤s without working on the payo¤
function.
In the case of the external constraint, we assume that all subjects are
inequality neutral except for Player 1. Player 1 would obey the constraint if
the utility of being a nonsignatory (6:75  2:25
4
  15:75
4
) is better than being
a signatory (3:75  8:25
4
) . However, the subject would violate the external
constraint when she has high inequality aversion. Since the disadvantage-
aversion is indi¤erent to the advantage-aversion, Player 1 would violate the
external constraint when 16
13
<  (or p > 45
26
) . However, altruism cannot be
captured in this test because Player 1 is unlikely to join the coalition with
Players 3, 4 and 5, as mentioned earlier.
Similarly, Player 2 would violate the external constraint only when the
subjects preference p > 37
26
. It means that Player 2 is very unlikely to join
the coalition.
In the case of the internal constraint, if others are inequality-neutral,
Player 3 would follow the internal constraint when the utility of joining
(1   8:5
4
) is higher than the utility of not joining (0). However, if Player 3
has strongly inequality-averse preference, p > 0:97, Player 3 would violate
the internal constraint and not join the coalition. With the unique coali-
tion condition, whether the external constraint is obeyed by others or not,
the equilibrium would be a failed coalition because Players 3, 4 and 5 are
irreplaceable.
Similarly, Players 4 and 5 would violate the internal constraint if their
preference p > 0:97.
We can therefore calculate the threshold to break the internal and external
constraints for each subject. Subjects who break the external constraint
would have very high advantage aversion. However, we should note that
altruism can not be captured in our test. On the other hand, the internal
constraint is more likely to be violated. The thresholds are also very high.
This could explain that subjects are likely to follow their weakly dominant
strategies.
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3.3. The results from the experiment
In the inequality-averse test, each subject was asked to choose from two
options in 11 rounds. In the theoretical prediction, the decision in round 1
would be Option 2and the decision in round 11 would be Option 1. One
turning point was expected and that was when the decision changed from
Option 2 to Option 1. The result demonstrates that 33 out of 50 subjects
had no more than one switching point in 11 rounds, while 2 subjects took
Option 1 in the whole part. The degrees of inequality-aversion were therefore
determined.
Figure 2 presents the number of subjects taking Option 1 in each round.
The majority had their switch point at rounds 3, 4, 5, or 6. After round
7, almost every subject took Option 2. Although the experimental design
allowed the existence of inequality acceptors, as predicted in the assumption
of the theory, the degree of inequality-aversion was unlikely to be negative.
As mentioned earlier, ve subjects were excluded because they were negative
inequality-averse.
Table 4 shows the OLS estimation of inequality-averse preference. The
dependent variable is average times of taking the Option 1 in the inequality-
averse test. Independent variables are subjectsage (AGE), political atti-
tude (POLITIC), and religious attitude (RELIGION). The result shows that
these factors from our questionnaire have insignicant e¤ect on subjects
inequality-averse preferences.
In the membership game, all subjects were put into 10 groups and took
four sub-treatments in 60 rounds. Groups 1 to 4 used Treatment 1 in Table
2 and groups 5 to 10 used Treatment 2 in Table 3. Each subject in the
group was given a di¤erent value of the marginal benet parameter . This
parameter implied their contribution to the group, if they decided to join
in. When the total contribution of a group was over 1, the coalition was
protable and everyone received the payo¤which depended on their decisions.
Otherwise, an unprotable coalition brought nothing to all the players in the
group. With the assumption of no inequality-aversion, the peculiar design of
this experiment leads to a unique equilibrium and the total contribution of
this stable coalition is 1:05.
Figure 3 shows the results of the total contribution of groups 1 to 4. The
charts in the rst row present the total contribution of groups 1, 2, 3, and
4 in sub-treatment 1 respectively. Similarly, the charts in the second, third
and fourth rows present the total contribution of groups 1, 2, 3, and 4 in
sub-treatments 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
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Figure 4 shows the results of the total contribution of groups 5 to 10. The
charts in the rst row present the total contribution of groups 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
and 10 in sub-treatment 1 respectively. Similarly, the charts in the second,
third and fourth rows present the total contribution of groups 5, 6, 7, 8, 9
and 10 in sub-treatments 2, 3 and 4 respectively.
In light of the study population, protable coalitions were formed in 387
of 600 rounds. The various forms of group formation lead to di¤erent group
payo¤s. For example, group 6 and group 8 both take Treatment 2. Group 6
forms protable coalitions in 47 rounds, but group 8 achieved that in only 12
rounds. Both treatments provided subjects with weakly dominant strategies
to take. If subjects in the group all made their weakly dominant strategies,
the internal and external constraints were held and the coalition was at Nash
equilibrium. It happened in 112 out of 600 rounds and such a coalition was
not stable as predicted in the theory. According to the experimental results,
more than two third of the protable coalitions were formed and they were
larger than the Nash equilibrium size.
In order to test our hypothesis, we examine the subjectsdecision in the
past round and their individual inequality-averse preferences to predict their
next move. The indicated level of inequality-aversion is therefore employed
to predict individual decisions in a coalition game. Figure 5 presents the
total contribution of Groups 1 to 4. Similarly, the actual total contribution
and the predicted total contribution with and without inequality-aversion of
Groups 5 to 10 are shown in Figures 6 and 7.
The blue line with spots in each chart presents the actual total contribu-
tion in a sub-treatment. Given the results in the past round, the red line with
cross marks are the prediction of the total contribution with the decision in
the past round and subjectsindividual inequality-averse preferences. There
are two main reasons for employing this prediction. First, the subjects know
their own inequality aversion parameter, but not others. The test in Part 1
of the experiment was anonymous and independent of Part 3, the subjects
should not learn othersinequality-averse preferences. Second, learning and
reciprocity are not considered in our model. Though the experiment design
allows subjects nding their dominant strategy, it is not expected to gure
out others social preference. Since the subjects know no more than their
own individual preferences and the historical decisions on the membership
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game, our prediction should be based on such information12.
In order to examine our conjecture, the green line with triangle marks is
generated only with the individual decisions in the past round only. In other
words, this predictions are based on the assumption of neutral inequality-
averse preference.
Compared to these neutral predictions, in most cases, the predicted to-
tal contributions with inequality-aversion is higher. Both predictions are
higher than the protable threshold during the whole experiment. When
subjects have high inequality-aversion, the result is not as unprotable as we
expected. Besides, when the inequality-aversion is not taken into account,
the predictions are more stable and closer to the actual outcomes.
When we examine the individual decisions, the predictions with inequality-
aversion match the actual decisions by 1838 over 2800 observations (65:6%)
while those neutral predictions match the actual decision by 74%. The inter-
nal constraint was not supposed to be violated but the results suggest oth-
erwise. In the sample of 1540 observations, the predictions with inequality-
aversion match the actual outcome at 77:2% of the observations, while those
neutral predictions matched by 84:9%. On the other hand, the predictions
on those observations when subjects should follow the external constraint
are lower. Amongst the 1260 observations, the predictions with inequality-
aversion matched by 51:5% and the neutral predictions match by 61:0%.
To further the discussion, the possible factors are examined by Maximum
Likelihood Estimation(MLE) of binary probit regressions. The variables in
Table 5 are the decision made at the last round (DECISION( 1)), the aver-
age number taking Option 1 in the inequality-averse test (INEQ), the year
subjects were born (AGE), the political preference from left (1) to right (5)
(POLITIC), the religion preference from atheist (1) to religionist (5) (RE-
LIGION), the weakly dominant strategy from not joining (0) to joining (1)
(WD STRATEGY), the marginal benet of the total contribution (), and
the total contribution of the group at the last round (TC ( 1)).
As mentioned earlier, the data of ve subjects has been excluded because
their attitude to inequality is opposite to our assumption which says the sub-
12This experimental design attempts to purify the individual decision, any bias from
other subjects preferences should be minimised. It would be a potentially interesting
but very complex issue to model (essentially testing Bayesian learning), we will leave this
challenge to the future studies.
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jects dislike inequality. We examine 45 subjects who have di¤erent degrees
of inequality-aversion. The estimation of Probit MLEs(1) covers all observa-
tions of 2700 decisions which were made individually. Because two variables
depend on the outcomes at the last round, only 2520 observations are used
for the regression. Amongst these 2520 observations, the subjects decided to
join 1692 times and not to join 828 times.
The inequality-averse factor (INEQ), the weakly dominant strategies (WD
STRATEGY) and the decision at the last round (DECISION( 1)) have a
positive e¤ect on the decision at the 1% signicance level. This interesting
result implies that the higher inequality-aversion a subject has, the higher
incentive this subject has to participate in the coalition. Also, when the de-
cision at the last round or the weakly dominant strategy is being made, the
subjects are more likely to choose joining. The marginal benet of total con-
tribution () has a negative e¤ect on decision-making at the 1% signicance
level due to the free-riding e¤ect when the subjectsweakly dominant strat-
egy was not to join. Nevertheless, it is insignicant even if the subjects join a
coalition in the case where the total contribution at the last round (TC( 1))
is to join. Reviewing the factors listed in the questionnaire, (AGE) and
(POLITIC) appear to be statistically insignicant. But, (RELIGION) has a
negative e¤ect at the 5% signicance level. That means, the more religious
a player is, the less likely s/he will join.
It was assumed that the subjects with a higher degree of inequality-
aversion were more likely to violate the internal and the external constraints.
In order to assess the internal constraint, we use Probit MLE(2) to exam-
ine the observations where the subjectsweakly dominant strategy was to
join. 85% out of the 1500 observations obeyed the internal constraint. In our
hypothesis, the subjects with a higher degree of inequality-aversion were ex-
pected to violate the internal constraint, and the coe¢ cient of INEQ should
be negative. However, interestingly, the results show that INEQ has a pos-
itive e¤ect at the 1% signicance level. This striking outcome implies that
subjects with a higher degree of inequality-aversion are more likely to to join
a coalition. Consequently, this outcome suggests that these subjects with a
higher degree of inequality-aversion are less likely to violate the internal con-
straint. That said, the subjects have stronger incentives to form a protable
coalition when their sense of inequality-aversion is higher. Perhaps due to
those subjectss preference of having a fair outcome, a safe act which could
keep their payo¤s low appears to be more favourable than a risky strategy
of punishing other outsiders and forcing them to participate. Those with a
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lower degree of inequality-aversion tend to act strategically. They usually
attempt to punish free-riders from time to time and force outsiders to par-
ticipate in a coalition. Such strategic behaviour makes the coalition process
unstable over rounds. Comparing the experimental outcomes with the nu-
merical example, we have observed instability in the coalition formation in
the experimental results. The experimental results show that the instability
is caused by the subjects with low degrees of inequality-aversion rather than
those with high degrees.
The estimation of Probit MLE(3) tests the factors included in the ques-
tionnaire and the previous results. 1400 observations were collected, except
for those in the rst round where each sub-treatment was with weakly dom-
inant strategies of joining. The internal constraint was violated 215 times.
The result also supports a signicant positive e¤ect on the decision-making at
the last round. The e¤ect of (RELIGION) is rather insignicant in this test
and (POLITIC) instead has a negative e¤ect at the 5% signicance level. It
suggests that the pro-right-wingers violating the internal constraint is higher
than that of the pro-left-wingers
This result could be explained in the example of Group 9. Four out of
ve subjects in the group had a switch point in the inequality-averse test.
For example, Subject 44 had the highest degree of inequality-aversion - the
switch point was at p = 0:9. The switch point of subjects 43, 45 and 41 were
0:8, 0:8, and 0:5 respectively. In the membership game, subject 44 violated
the internal constraint in only three out of 45 rounds. The violation rates of
subjects 43, 45 and 41 are 3%, 0%, and 43%. It shows that the subjects with
a higher degree of inequality-aversion were less likely to violate the internal
constraint.
However, the internal constraint could be broken by the subjects with a
higher degree of inequality-aversion in a few cases. Group 5 where everyone in
the group had a switch point in the inequality-averse test as a good example.
Subject 21 had the highest degree of inequality-aversion and the switch point
is at p = 0:9. Following that, the degree of subjects 22 and 24 is p = 0:8,
the degree of subject 25 is p = 0:7, and subject 23 is inequality-neutral - the
switch point is at p = 0:5. Subject 21 violates the internal constraint in 30%
of the 30 rounds, while the violation rates of subjects 22, 24, and 25 are 13%,
0%, and 3% respectively. In this case, the subjects with a higher degree of
inequality-aversion are more likely to act against the internal constraint.
The external constraint is assessed by the estimation of Probit MLE(4)
where the observationsweakly dominant strategy is not-to-join. The con-
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straint was violated in 45% of the 1120 observations. When a coalition is
unprotable, it is indi¤erent whether to join or not. Hence, the subjects
would make a random decision in the next round. This is the reason why
the external constraint was violated in almost half of the observations.
When a protable coalition was formed, 44% of the subjects would vi-
olate the external constraint in the next round. If we only look at those
subjects with a higher degree of inequality-aversion (INEQ> 0:8), only 40%
of them violated the constraint. Turning to the results from those with a
low degree of inequality-aversion (INEQ< 0:5), the constraint was violated
in almost half of the observations. The result shows that the subjects with
a high degree of inequality-aversion were more likely to be free-riders. This
might appear to be counter-intuitive at rst sight, but the subjects with a
low degree of inequality-aversion have demonstrated di¤erent behaviour of
forcing outsiders to participate when their dominant strategy was to join a
coalition. When their roles changed to the opposite, they were more likely
to compromise and cooperate.
The estimation of Probit MLE(5) examines the factors from the ques-
tionnaire. In our hypothesis, the marginal benet of the total contribution
() has a signicant negative e¤ect on the decision. In contrast to the exper-
imental evidence of Burger and Kolstad (2010), our results do not support
their earlier nding that said that higher marginal benets would signi-
cantly increase a coalition size and consequently the total contribution. This
is mainly because our design limits any possible free-riding by excluding the
subjects with high marginal benet. This e¤ect is shown in the estimation of
Probit MLE(1). Despite the limitation of our design, the factor of the mar-
ginal benet in the estimation of Probit MLE(5) is signicantly negative and
corresponds to the earlier ndings. Our study provides more detailed infor-
mation, compared to the existing literature, about how potential free-riding
benets would weaken the incentives for participation. When the dominant
strategy is not to join, higher free-riding benet comes with higher marginal
benet. The coalition size was likely to be larger than the equilibrium size
when the players are with lower marginal benets.
Our results can be summarised as below
Summary 3.
In terms of the coalition formation, the predictions with inequality-aversion
does not outperform those without.
In terms of the individual decisions when subjects could free-ride, those
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with a higher marginal benet were less likely to join a coalition and prefer
to have a lower payo¤. On the other hand, the subjects with a high degree
of religious belief were more likely to be free-riders by not joining a coalition
and having higher payo¤.
Right-wingers are more likely to build a larger coalition when they could
be free-riders. Comparing to the results on the internal constraint, right-
wingers are more likely to violate both internal and external constraints.
Right-wingers tend to act strategically by punishing and compromising when
they are in di¤erent roles.
4. Conclusion
This study has investigated the incentives to participate in IEAs with
the other-regarding preferences, particularly the preference of inequality-
aversion. The theory used in this study suggests that a stable coalition
can be formed both internally and externally, when the signatories have no
incentive to leave and the nonsignatories have no incentive to join. The as-
sumption of inequality-averse preference argues that such a stable coalition
would change by considering agentspreferences. Agents with a higher de-
gree of inequality-aversion are more likely to break the internal constraint
and leave the coalition.
A two-part experiment has been conducted to validate this theory. The
rst part was a test to measure the individual attitude to inequality-aversion.
The second part was a public good game conducted to mimic the interna-
tional environmental convention. Subjects were given di¤erent payo¤ tables
and asked whether to join or not to join a coalition.
In order to fully capture individual behaviours in an IEA, the experiment
has been designed in such a way that teased out as much noise and as many
uncertainties as possible. In other words, the theoretical prediction for the
experiment was puried to a unique equilibrium. In contrast to the existing
literature, the results in this particular design do not support the theoret-
ical prediction that a higher marginal benet would signicantly enlarge a
coalition size and the total contribution. On the contrary, the subjects with
a lower degree of inequality-aversion are more likely to act strategically by
violating the internal constraint. By doing so, they could force free-riders to
participate. But, when their role changes to the opposite, they reacted to
compromise their payo¤s.
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Some other factors inquired in the questionnaire, such as the political
preference and religion preference, have also shown signicant e¤ects on the
decision-making. Pro-right-wingers behave as those with a lower degree of
inequality-aversion and make more strategical decisions.
Although it is di¢ cult to generalise solely based on one experiment which
has its own limitations in design and data collection, this study has provided
some promising results for understanding the real-world operation of IEAs,
especially the dynamics that emerged during the decision making processes.
One rm conclusion is that, in order to stabilise a coalition internally, in-
ternational conventions had better emphasize the importance of fairness to
signatories because a high degree of inequality-averse preference would lead a
country to participate. An IEA could be enlarged when nonsignatories were
informed of the potential damage if the target of the IEA cannot be achieved.
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Appendix 1
Proof. To proof the theorem, we establish an algorithm to nd a stable
coalition. Player n has the incentive to maintain n-member coalition if the
payo¤ sn (n
) = ( 1) +Pni i is positive. If player n leaves, the coalition
collapsed. Hence, player n gets nsn (n  1) = 1 when all player pollute.
When the internal constraint makes player n to be stable in the coalition,
all signatories have the same incentive to make it stable internally.
Meanwhile, the external constraint asks player N to stay away from
the n-member coalition. When player N is a nonsignatory, its payo¤ is
nsN (n
) = (N  n). If player N changes its mind and joins the coalition as
the (n + 1)-th member, the payo¤becomes sN (n
 + 1) =
h
( 1) +Pni ii+
N . When the external constraint deters player N to join the coalition,
all nonsignatories are deterred and the coalition becomes stable externally.
Hence, the theorem is established.
By the internal and external constraints, the minimum number to form
a protable coalition is found. However, this coalition is not the only equi-
librium. A coalition with more members could be another equilibrium if
and only if both constraints are held. A unique equilibrium exists when any
member is irreplaceable by a larger coalition. It means that, if all nonsigna-
tories would like to replace the player n with the smallest marginal benet
of abatement (n) in the coalition, the coalition would collapse. In other
words, a (N   1)-member without player n is unprotable. We can write it
in an inequality
1 >
n 1X
i=1
i +
NX
j=n+1
j
To add the marginal benet of abatement of player n in both sides, the
unique equilibrium condition is rewritten as
1 + n >
NX
i=1
i
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A. Appendix 2
Proof. The utility of a signatory i with a n-member coalition can be ex-
tended to the function with the degree of inequality-aversion as
usi (n) = 
s
i (n) 
i
N   1
X
m6=i
max [m   si (n) ; 0] (14)
Because of the external constraint, any nonsignatory has higher utility
than what a signatory has. Signatory i has the disadvantage term but no
advantage term.
On the other hand, the welfare function of a nonsignatory j with n-
member coalition is
unsj (n) = 
ns
j (n) 
j
N   1
X
j 6=m
max

m   nsj (n) ; 0
  j
N   1
X
m6=j
max

nsj (n)  m; 0

(15)
Nonsignatories could have both the advantage and disadvantage terms.
They are advantaged since their individual payo¤s are denitely higher than
that of a signatory. The one with the highest marginal benet of the total
abatement yields the highest payo¤ among others. Any other nonsignatory
would be disadvantaged to this country.
The stability of the coalition formation depends on the internal and the
external constraints. The internal one can be displayed as
usi (n
) > unsi (n
   1)
=)
 
 1 +
nX
i=1
i
!
  i
N   1
NX
j=n+1
"
nj  
 
 1 +
nX
i=1
i
!#
> 0
The left-hand-side is the utility when i joins the coalition, and the right-
hand-side is the utility when i does not join.
If i is not strong inequality averse, the player would follow the internal
constraint and decide to participate the coalition. If i is strong inequality
averse, both the individual inequality-averse factor i and the disadvantage
loss are high enough, the player would violate the internal constraint and the
consequence is a collapse coalition.
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On the other hand, the external constraint can be extended as
unsj (n
) > usi (n
 + 1)
=) nk  
k
N   1
X
k 6=j
max [j   nsk (n) ; 0] 
k
N   1
X
k 6=j
max [nsk (n
)  j; 0]
>
 
 1 +
nX
i=1
i + k
!
  k
N   1
X
k 6=j
max
"
(n + 1) j  
 
 1 +
nX
i=1
i + k
!#
where k is a player belongs to [n + 1; N ]. The left-hand-side is ks utility
when k is a nonsignatory and have the disadvantage loss from higher marginal
benet nonsignatories as well as the advantage loss from all signatories and
lower marginal benet nonsignatories. The right-hand-side is ks utility when
k is a signatory which only has the disadvantage loss.
When k does not have enough advantage averse, the player would follow
the external constraint and not to participate in the coalition. When k has
strong inequality aversion, both the individual inequality-averse factor k
and k, and the disadvantage and advantage loss are high, the player would
violate the external constraint and join the coalition.
To summarise, given all subjectsinequality aversion is not strong enough,
both the internal and external constraint are held. There exists a unique
stable n-member coalition as we yield in Proposition 2. If the internal
constraint is held, but the external constraint is violated, there exists a stable
coalition which the size is larger than n members. If the internal constraint
is violated, due to any subject having strong inequality aversion, there exists
no coalition to be formed.
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Round Option 1 Option 2
1 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 0%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 100%
2 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 10%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 90%
3 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 20%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 80%
4 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 30%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 70%
5 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 40%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 60%
6 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 50%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 50%
7 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 60%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 40%
8 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 70%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 30%
9 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 80%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 20%
10 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 90%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 10%
11 (£ 2:5, £ 2:5) for sure
(£ 0, £ 5) with probability 100%
and (£ 5, £ 0) with probability 0%
Table 1: Distribution of payo¤ in all 11 rounds in the inequality-aversion test
31
Round Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5
1  15 0:675 0:375 0:125 0:10 0:075
16  30 0:075 0:15 0:25 0:3 0:35
31  45 0:40 0:65 0:075 0:10 0:125
46  60 0:05 0:1 0:4 0:35 0:3
 means the weakly dominant strategy of the player is joining the coalition.
Table 2: List of parameters of marginal benet for players taking Treatment 1
Round Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Player 4 Player 5
1  15 0:075 0:1 0:45 0:35 0:25
16  30 0:125 0:1 0:15 0:5 0:55
31  45 0:45 0:6 0:05 0:2 0:1
46  60 0:45 0:25 0:2 0:15 0:05
 means the weakly dominant strategy of the player is joining the coalition.
Table 3: List of parameters of marginal benet for players taking Treatment 2
Variable
Inequality-aversion level
OLS Regression
Constant term
 12:53
(11:15)
AGE
0:007
(0:006)
POLITIC
0:005
(0:03)
RELIGION
 0:02
(0:02)
Log Likelihood 19:13514 R-squared 0:042
Total Observation 50
Note: Each cell contains coe¢ cient and standard error in parenthesis.
, ,  are signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Table 4: OLS estimation of inequality-averse preference
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Variable
Probit
MLEs(1)
Probit
MLEs(2)
Probit
MLEs(3)
Probit
MLEs(4)
Probit
MLEs(5)
Constant term
8.32
(12.49)
0.52***
(0.16)
-9.77
(20.54)
-0.05
(0.05)
11.01
(16.72)
DECISION (-1)
1.19***
(0.07)
1.36***
(0.13)
1.01***
(0.09)
INEQ
0.50***
(0.19)
0.81***
(0.24)
-0.15**
(0.08)
AGE
-0.005
(0.006)
0.005
(0.01)
-0.005
(0.008)
POLITIC
0.05
(0.03)
-0.13**
(0.05)
0.23***
(0.05)
RELIGION
-0.05**
(0.02)
0.02
(0.03)
-0.17***
(0.03)
WD STRATEGY
1.16***
(0.10)

-1.27***
(0.26)
-6.45***
(1.11)
TC (-1)
-0.16
(0.12)
-0.26
(0.21)
-0.36**
(0.16)
Log Likelihood -1165.01 -621.21 -515.43 -769.35 -629.48
Total Observation 2520 1500 1400 1120 1120
Observation with
decision is Join
1692 1279 1185 507 507
Note: Each cell contains coe¢ cient and standard error in parenthesis.
, ,  are signicant at 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively.
Table 5: Probit estimations of probability of joining a coalition
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Figure 1: Subject As inequality-averse preference
Figure 2: Number of subjects taking Option 1in each round
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Figure 6: The actual total contribution and the predicted total contribution of Groups 5
to 7
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Figure 7: The actual total contribution and the predicted total contribution of Groups 8
to 10
39
References
[1] Barrett, S. (1994). Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agree-
ments.Oxford Economic Paper. Vol. 46(1): 878-894.
[2] Barrett, S. (2001). International Cooperation for Sale.European Eco-
nomic Review. Vol. 45: 1835-1850.
[3] Blanco, M., Engelmann, D. and Normann, H.T. (2011). A Within-
Subject Analysis of Other-Regarding Preferences. Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior. Vol. 72(2): 321-338.
[4] Breton, M.; Sbragia, L.; and Zaccour, G. (2010). A Dynamic Model for
International Environmental Agreements". Environmental and Resource
Economics. Vol. 45(1): 25-48.
[5] Burger, N.E. and Kolstad, C.D. (2009). Voluntary Public Goods Pro-
vision, Coalition Formation, and UncertaintyNBER Working Papers
15543, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[6] Carlsson, F.; Daruvala, D. and Johansson-Stenman, O. (2005). Are
People Inequality-Averse, or Just Risk-Averse?Economica. Vol. 72(3):
375-396.
[7] Charness, G. and Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding Social Preferences
With Simple Tests. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 117(3):
817-869.
[8] Dannenberg, A., Riechmann, T., Sturm, B. and Vogt, C. (2007). In-
equity Aversion and Individual Behavior in Public Good Games: An
Experimental Investigation. Working paper.
[9] DAspremont, C., Jacquemin, A., Gabszewicz, J., Weymark, J. (1983).
On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership. Canadian Journal of
Economics. Vol. 16(1): 17-25.
[10] Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A Theory Of Fairness, Compe-
tition, And Cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol.
114(3): 817-868.
[11] Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zutich Toolbox for Ready-made Eco-
nomic Experiments.Experimental Economics. Vol. 10(2): 171-178.
40
[12] Greiner, B. (2004). The Online Recruitment System ORSEE 2.0 - A
Guide for the Organization of Experiments in Economics.Working Pa-
per Series in Economics 10, University of Cologne, Department of Eco-
nomics.
[13] Kolstad, C. D. (2014) Public Goods Agreements with Other-Regarding
Preferences. Working paper
[14] Kroll, Y. and Davidovitz, L. (2003). Inequality Aversion versus Risk
Aversion. Economica. Vol. 70 (277): 19-29.
[15] Kosfeld, M., Okada, A. and Riedl, A. (2009). Institution Formation in
Public Goods Games.American Economic Review. Vol. 99(4): 1335
55.
[16] Yang, Y.; Onderstal, S.; and Schram, A. (2012). Inequity Aversion
Revisited. Working paper.
41
